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Abstract - The new statutory derivative claim in the Companies Act 2006 ("CA 2006")
was meant to herald a more modem, flexible and accessible criteria for determining
whether a shareholder could pursue an action. It was aimed at tackling the problematic
rules which emerged from Foss v Harbottle (1843). This paper examines the two-
stage procedure in the CA 2006 Part 11 by focusing on specific elements within it, i.e.,
prima facie case, ratification etc. The complexities of pursuing a statutory derivative
claim will be highlighted by critically discussing how these elements have been
interpreted in recent case law such as Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel (2008) and Stainer
v Lee (2010). It will be argued that the uncertainty that presently plagues the two-stage
procedure and the interpretation of the elements within it is likely to lead to the demise
of the statutory derivative claim in England and Wales for the foreseeable future.
A. INTRODUCTION
Obscure, complex, rigid, old-fashioned and unwieldy are terms which
have all been used to describe the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 1 This
prompted the Law Commission of the United Kingdom to recommend
'that there should be a new derivative procedure with more modern,
flexible and accessible criteria for determining whether a shareholder can
pursue the action.' 2 This paper analyses the new statutory derivative claim
in the Companies Act 2006 ("CA 2006") Part 11 by examining the two-
stage procedure. Considering the breadth of the two-stage procedure, this
paper shall be focusing only on the prima facie case, section 172 (duty to
promote the success of the company) within sections 263(2)(a) and
263(3)(b), the applicant's good faith and ratification. Key cases such as
Stainer v Lee,3 Mission Capital plc v Sinclair4 and Franbar Holdings Ltd
v Patel5 will help to shed light on how courts are construing these matters
* The author would like to thank Professor John Lowry, University College London
for his valuable comments and input on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors or
omissions are the author's sole responsibility.
(1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189.
2 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: Report on a Reference under Section
3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No. 246, 1997) para 6.15.
3 [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch), [2011] BCC 134.
4 [2008] EWHC1339 (Ch), [2008] BCC 866.
5 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] BCC 885.
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in practice. Before proceeding with an analysis of the list of issues above,
any analysis of Part 11 would be remiss without a brief overview of Foss
v Harbottle. The paper also examines the judiciary's stance to indemnity
costs orders in the new regime and analyses whether such orders provide
the answer for shareholders' financial worries in pursuing a derivative
claim. Additionally, the paper will analyse the potential of obtaining
corporate relief in an unfair prejudice petition in light of Clark v Cutland6
and Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd.7 Finally, by
drawing together all the issues above, a conclusion will be made as to the
likely future for the new statutory derivative claim.
B. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF Foss VHARBOTTLE
The two overarching rules of Foss v Harbottle are the 'proper plaintiff
and the 'internal management' rules. The 'proper plaintiff rule states that
the appropriate person to bring a claim for wrongs done to a company is
the company itself. This rule has strong ties to the separate legal
personality doctrine where the company is viewed as a legal entity
separate and distinct from its members. It was stated by Lord Halsbury LC
in the seminal case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd8 'that once the
company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other
independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself ... .'9
What is apparent from this statement is that the company's rights and
liabilities are reserved to the company itself; it is generally for the
company to pursue its rights and settle its liabilities. Furthermore, in
Edwards v Halliwell,'0 Jenkins LJ affirmed that 'the proper plaintiff in an
action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or
association of persons is prima facie the company or the association of
persons itself."' The 'internal management' rule itself is closely linked to
the 'majority rule' where it is generally accepted that the courts will not
interfere with the commercial decisions of management. This is because
6 [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2004] 1 WLR 783.
7 [2007] UKPC 26, [2007] Bus LR 1521.
8[ 1897] AC 22 (HL).
9 ibid 30.
10 [1950] 2 All ER 1064.
" ibid 1066.
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shareholders are believed to be better placed to adjudicate internal issues
within the company. The oft-quoted phrase is that '[t]his Court is not to be
required on every Occasion to take the Management of every Playhouse
and Brewhouse in the Kingdom'. 12
How then would an individual shareholder be able to pursue a claim
to redress a wrong done to the company? The answer lies in the
exceptions to Foss v Harbottle. The 'fraud on the minority' exception
enabled an individual shareholder to pursue a claim belonging to the
company but in the shareholder's own name and obtain a corporate
remedy. To satisfy this exception, the wrongdoing had to amount to 'fraud'
and the wrongdoers must have been in control of the company. An
aggrieved minority shareholder would now be allowed to bring an action
on behalf of themselves and others, which in usual circumstances would
be blocked by the wrongdoers in control.13 These requirements seem on
the surface to be easily satisfied. However, the truth was that the law
relating to the rules in Foss v Harbottle and the exceptions was really only
accessible by specialist practitioners as it was essential to analyse case law
spanning a 150 years.14 Furthermore, restrictive judicial attitudes made it
questionable as to whether the courts were capable of developing a
coherent set of legal principles that would strike the proper balance
between the competing goals of enhancing 'shareholder confidence' and
not imposing 'significant burdens on management."' 5 This meant there
was no coherent principle underlying the rules and exceptions, which
made it difficult for lawyers let alone a shareholder layperson to build a
strong derivative claim.
C. Two-STAGE PROCEDURE
The two-stage procedure during the permission stage involves firstly (i)
the court considering whether a primafacie case has been satisfied; and (ii)
12 Carlen v Drury (1812) 1 V & B 154, 158; 35 ER 61, 63 (Lord Eldon LC).
13 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, 1067.
14 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies, (Law Com No. 246, 1997) para 1.4.
15 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies. A Consultation Paper (Law Com No.
142, 1996) para 1.13; Brian R. Cheffins, 'Reforming the Derivative Action: The
Canadian Experience and British Prospects' (1997) 2 Company, Financial and
Insolvency Law Review 227, 233.
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if a prima facie case is shown the court may require that evidence be
provided by the company. If the prima facie case is not satisfied, the court
must dismiss the case. The second stage involves the courts considering
the list of factors under CA 2006 ss. 263(2) and (3). Section 263(2) is of a
mandatory nature, while section 263(3) is discretionary. Judicial
discretion remains a significant and decisive part of the statutory
derivative claim as the courts wield considerable control through their
interpretation of the above factors. A troubling aspect about the list of
factors in s. 263(3) is their open-ended nature since they were intended by
the Law Commission to be non-exhaustive. Their limitless nature renders
them inherently uncertain. While practitioners struggle with the explicitly
stated factors in ss. 263(2) and 263(3), s. 263(3) is seemingly expandable
by the courts. At the moment when practitioners understand the
application of a particular factor, another one appears for them to contend
with. The Law Commission responded to concerns about the ambiguity of
these non-exhaustive factors by stating that an additional specific list of
factors together with developing case law would assist practitioners in
advising their clients.16 This will undoubtedly be of great assistance but
there remains a long wait for a burgeoning body of case law.
1. Prima Facie Case
The court must dismiss the application if the supporting evidence filed by
the applicant does not disclose a prima facie case for giving permission.
This stage was not recommended by the Law Commission since their
view was that including an express test on the merits could easily result in
a time consuming and expensive mini-trial.' 8 The prima facie case was
only subsequently included by Parliament. It was believed that an
adequate front-line safeguard should be in place for derivative claims to
'avoid opening a Pandora's Box to every disenchanted individual in the
country.' 19 The fear that the breadth of the new statutory derivative claim,
and the removal of 'fraud on the minority' and 'wrongdoer control' would
open the floodgates prompted this last minute addition. Parliament's
16 Law Com No. 246 (n 2) para 6.73.
17 Companies Act 2006, s. 261(2).
18 Law Com No. 246 (n 2) para 6.71.
19 HL Deb 9 May 2006, vol 681, col 885 (Lord Sharman).
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intention was that the courts should be able to dismiss frivolous claims
without the involvement of companies and at the earliest possible
opportunity.20 Although well-intentioned on their part, this was a failure to
foresee that requiring applicant shareholders to fulfil a prima facie case at
an early stage can often be onerous because of information asymmetries.
Furthermore, derivative claims are heavily based on factual disputes and
courts may be lured into the trap of carrying out mini-trials at this juncture.
We should however be more confident of the ability of judges in
approaching the prima facie case since Cheffins suggests that permission
hearings can be carried out expeditiously so long as judges refrain from
enforcing a heavy burden of proof on applicants.21 Regardless of whether
judges impose a heavy burden of proof, it is the applicant's supporting
evidence that is crucial in the prima facie case. One suspects that judges
will continue to be inundated with bundles of pleadings and evidentiary
documents to disclose a primafacie case.
What does prima facie mean? This test is familiar to practitioners as
22it had been the primary test in interim injunction applications. But
establishing the probability of success is not clear-cut. Gibbs suggests that
satisfying the prima facie case requires merely establishing more than a 0
23
per cent chance of success, which is derived from the Australian courts'
approach in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats
Pty Ltd2 4 and is in turn taken from American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon
Ltd.2 5 With respect I fail to see where the 0 per cent chance of success is
derived from. It was clearly stated in American Cyanamid that the courts
must be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried, and fettering
the court's discretion by a technical rule based on whether the plaintiffs
success lay above or below the 50 per cent mark was thought to be
20 ibid col 883 (Lord Goldsmith).
21 Cheffins (nl5) 245.
22 Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, 'Something Old, Something New, Something
Borrowed: an Analysis of the New Derivative Action under the Companies Act
2006' (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 469, 480.
23 David Gibbs, 'Has the Statutory Derivative Fulfilled its Objectives? A Prima Facie
Case and the Mandatory Bar: Part 1' (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 41, 42.
24 [2001] HCA 63, (2001) 208 CLR 199 (High Court of Australia).
25 [1975] AC 396 (HL).
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inappropriate.26 This means that rigid, mechanistic calculations should be
avoided. 'Serious question to be tried' provides a more realistic
assessment of whether a case should proceed. However, caution is
adopted to ensure that the merits of the proposed derivative claim are not
generally entered into.27 This is to avoid the first stage being turned into a
drawn out process. Under common law in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v
Newman Industries (No. 2),28 the Court of Appeal stated that the plaintiff
ought to establish a prima facie case '(i) that the company is entitled to
the relief claimed, and (ii) that the action falls within the proper
boundaries of the exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle.'29 Under Part
11, there will no longer be any requirement to satisfy the exception to the
rule. What can be gleaned from the above statement is that an applicant
has to establish a good cause of action that should be tried. Perhaps all
that is required is to demonstrate: a credible case; a substantive claim; a
genuine triable issue; or that the case is worthy of being heard in full.3 0
With such varying thresholds the prima facie case is still decidedly
difficult to pinpoint. However, whether the test follows that under interim
injunction applications or common law, it is clear that prima facie is not a
foreign concept. Precedents will build a clearer picture for practitioners in
understanding this test although trawling through case law is admittedly
undesirable.
Some commentators have remarked that the judiciary's approach to
the prima facie case might be to allow the claim to go through to the
second stage should there be something in the claim31 since it would still
32be possible to stop proceedings at that stage. If this is truly borne out by
the courts, the prima facie case is in reality redundant and unnecessary.
Significant time and resources would be squandered on this first stage
26 ibid 406-07.
27 Swansson v R A Pratt Properties Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 583 [25].
28 [1982] Ch 204 (CA).
29 ibid 222.
30 Keay and Loughrey (n 22) 484.
31 Simon James, 'The Curse of Uncertain Times' (2007) 8 Journal of International
Banking and Financial Law 447, 448.
32 Brenda Hannigan and Dan Prentice, Hannigan and Prentice: The Companies Act
2006 -A Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths 2007) para 4.46.
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since the rationale underlying its existence ie a screening mechanism
could as easily be achieved in the second stage.
Recent cases dealing with the prima facie case will now be examined.
In Jesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd,33 Lewison J noted that the judge at first
instance had considered there was a prima facie case on paper and with
that moved on to the second stage. The only explanation provided by
Lewison J was that:3 4
At the first stage, the applicant is required to make a prima facie case for
permission to continue a derivative claim, and the court considers the question
on the basis of the evidence filed by the applicant only, without requiring
evidence from the defendant or the company. The court must dismiss the
application if the applicant cannot establish aprimafacie case.
This is not extremely helpful since this was already apparent from s.
261(2) in any case. However, the fact that Lewison J pointed out that no
evidence will be required at this stage from the defendant or the company
makes it clear that the prima facie case should not turn into a mini trial of
sorts.
In Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association35 there was no
consideration of the first-stage because Judge Pelling QC considered that
to be unduly elaborate in the circumstances. He preferred to adopt a
fictional approach that the case had been considered at the first stage since
this reflected both the procedural and practical reality, and would yield the
* 36*fair and proper result. His reasoning is puzzling since no consideration
of the prima facie case was conducted either procedurally or in reality.
Despite the reasoning this approach is to be welcomed. Whether a
company has a good cause of action or serious question to be tried can
equally be answered at the second stage during consideration of the long
list of factors there. This approach can save applicants incurring
unnecessary costs in passing an additional first hurdle. However, this
leads to the unsatisfactory result of having a redundant process in the
permission stage. That certainly was never Parliament's intention.
33 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), [2010] BCC 420.
34 ibid [78].
35 [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch), [2010] BCC 387.
36 ibid [3].
184
Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivatives Claim? 185
In the Scottish case of Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd,37 their
Lordships stated that:3 8
the question is not whether the application and supporting evidence disclose a
prima facie case against the defenders in the proposed derivative proceedings,
but whether there is no prima facie case disclosed for granting the application
for leave... It is to be noted that no onus is placed on the applicant to satisfy the
court that there is a primafacie case: rather, the court is to refuse the application
if it is satisfied that there is not aprimafacie case.
The subtle difference is that the first connotes a positive obligation on the
applicant, while the latter indicates that the court is unsatisfied with the
supporting evidence disclosing a prima facie case. This means a low
threshold is placed on the applicant at this point3 9 because the onus on the
applicant has been dispensed in favour of a more judicial discretionary
stance. Since Wishart is merely persuasive and not binding on English
courts it will be interesting to see whether this approach will be followed
by the English courts in the future.
In Mission Capital plc v Sinclair40 and Franbar Holdings Ltd v
Patel41 the two-stage procedure was effectively telescoped into one. In
Franbar, counsel for the defendants had accepted that 'it would be
appropriate... to deal with the entirety of the application for permission to
continue at a single hearing.' 42 While in Mission Capital the parties
agreed to combine the two parts of the process which the judge regarded
as 'sensible'. 43 Would it then not be 'sensible' to embark on the two-stage
procedure? This was clearly not the position taken by the judge in Langley
Ward Limited v Gareth Wynn Trevor, Seven Holdings Limitedi 4 when he
expressed his disappointment that the preliminary filter of a prima facie
37 2009] CSIH 65, 2010 SC 16.
38 ibid [31].
39 Andrew Keay and Joan Loughrey, 'Derivative Proceedings in a Brave New World
for Company Management and Shareholders' [2010] Journal of Business Law 151,
155; Daniel Lightman, 'Coming of Age?' (2010) 160 New Law Journal 1750, 1750.
40 [2008] EWHC 1339 (Ch), [2008] BCC 866.
41 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] BCC 885.
42 ibid [24].
43 [2008] EWHC1339 (Ch), [2008] BCC 866 [36].
44 [2011] EWHC 1893 (Ch).
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case had been bypassed entirely, which was an unfortunate distortion of
the statutory procedure. 45 The recent trend is to either bypass the prima
facie case proceeding directly to the second stage, or to bundle the two-
stage procedure into a single hearing.
The prima facie case imposes an unnecessary hurdle for applicants.
If the reform aim was to create a 'modern, flexible and accessible criteria',
the inclusion of a prima facie case has not assisted in delivering such
criteria. An extra hurdle acts as a deterrent for potential applicants. Recent
cases have nevertheless shown that the first stage has mostly either been
bypassed or telescoped. The courts have also construed the prima facie
case leniently. In a table of six cases dealing with prima facie decisions
which were examined by Gibbs, 4 6 all passed the threshold test. This is a
reminder that the first hurdle will likely be the easier one to overcome as a
whole. Thus, lawyers and applicants may be comforted to know that the
prima facie case is hardly an obstacle. They can now focus their attentions
on the second stage which will likely be determinative in the granting of
permission. It is increasingly likely that the first stage will be ignored in
future cases to the great relief of applicants but heavy sigh of defendants.
2. Section 172 (Duty to Promote the Success of the Company)
Section 172 is a new statutory provision, embodying the concept of
'enlightened shareholder value', whose precise meaning is unclear. The
reference to s. 172 twice under ss. 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b) stresses its
importance. Linking Part 11 to directors' duties was always going to be
complicated because the codification of directors' duties has not
eliminated the need to refer to past case law. There is ambiguity
surrounding the importance of common law rules or equitable principles
in interpreting s. 172. This uncertainty may have a spillover effect in
terms of construing s. 172 during the permission stage. Do the decisions
of directors, in light of the business judgement rule, remain centre stage in
the interpretation of s.172?47 If it is, this can 'operate to abrogate the
45 ibid [6]-[7].
46 Gibbs (n 23) 43.
47 Joseph Lee, 'Shareholders' Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006:
Market Mechanism or Asymmetric Paternalism?' (2007) 18 International
Company and Commercial Law Review 378, 380.
186
Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivatives Claim? 187
court's discretion in favour of that of the company's management, who
could effectively scupper any derivative claim.' 4 8 This statement alludes
to concerns that deferring to the judgment of company's management will
hinder the pursuance of derivative claims. This is because few directors
will pursue a derivative claim for reasons such as reputational damage to
the company, high financial costs, disruption to management, etc. but will
now be able to justify their reasons by reference to their good faith
judgment under s. 172. The interpretation of s. 172 ultimately lies with the
courts whose role is to exercise tight judicial control.4 9
(a) Section 263(2)(a) - Mandatory Factor
How have the courts construed s. 172 within s. 263(2)(a)? In Franbar,
William Trower QC refused to apply the mandatory bar under s. 263(2)(a).
He was of the opinion that there was 'room for more than one view.'5 0 He
was sympathetic to the position in which directors often find themselves
when deciding whether to pursue a derivative claim. This can be said of
most derivative claims as directors are often faced with competing
considerations. It is refreshing to see a realistic and empathetic judgment
on directors' decision-making in this instance. The approach taken by the
judge here was to allow the claim to pass through this hurdle granted there
was 'sufficient material for the hypothetical director to conclude that the
conduct... had given rise to actionable breaches of duty.'5 1 It will be a rare
case where the material is so lacking that a hypothetical director would
not seek to bring a claim. Therefore, a flexible approach coupled with a
minimum of sufficient material suggests a low mandatory threshold to
overcome.
Jesini52 is significant for clarifying that s. 263(2)(a) applies 'only
where the court is satisfied that no director acting in accordance with
s.172 would seek to continue the claim,' and '[i]f some directors would,
and others would not, seek to continue the claim, the case is one for the
48 John Lowry and Arad Reisberg, Pettet's Company Law: Company and Capital
Markets Law (3 rd edn, Pearson Longman 2009) 239.
49 HL Deb 27 February 2006, vol 679, col GC5 (Lord Goldsmith).
50 Franbar [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] BCC 885 [30].
51 ibid.
52 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), [2010] BCC 420.
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application of s.263(3)(b).' 5 3 Both phrases combined indicate a plurality
of hypothetical directors, which is confusing since s. 263(2)(a) is
expressed as a singular person. This is a precarious situation as the very
foundation of s. 172 - the hypothetical director - which is central to the
permission stage is tenuous. The courts in future cases are urged to
clarify this unfortunate position.
In Stimpson the judge relied heavily on the guidance in Franbar but
drew attention to the fact that such a list was not comprehensive. 54 The list
of issues will therefore vary on a case to case basis depending on their
own particular factual circumstances. In reality ss. 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b)
are fluid and highly interconnected factors, which is why the issues
identified by William Trower QC in Franbar in relation to s. 263(3)(b)
were considered under the mandatory bar of s. 263(2)(a) in that case.
Stimpson also indicates that a balancing exercise is required when dealing
with competing objectives in a company with mixed objects. 5 But it does
not go further than this and it is regrettable a more detailed framework
was not laid out.
Similarly, in lesini Lewison J, while examining whether there was a
mandatory bar, provided a list of factors which a director acting in
accordance with s. 172 would consider such as the size of the claim, cost
of proceedings, disruption to the company's activities, company's ability
to fund the proceedings etc. 56 This should prove useful for lawyers and
applicants seeking an indication of what the courts will deem important as
factors for directors to consider under s. 172. It is envisaged that these
factors will be used as a reference by other courts in the future.
In Kiani v Cooper,5 7 Proudman J found that a director acting in
accordance with s. 172 would decide to continue the proceedings, at least
down to disclosure, on the basis that there was some strong evidence in
favour of the case advanced by the applicant. Furthermore, a hypothetical
director would consider the size of the claim, approximately E296,000,
which if successful would ensure full return for all creditors.' 8 Financial
53 ibid [86].
54 [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch), [2010] BCC 387 [28].
s ibid [26].
56 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), [2010] BCC 420 [85].
5 [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch), [2010] BCC 463.
58 ibid [44].
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considerations will likely be one of the more important factors a
hypothetical director will have regard to. A company's success is usually
equated with financial prosperity. But this may not necessarily apply to
companies that are non-profit organisations. Courts will have to be privy
to this; it will be appropriate to follow the guidance provided in
Stimpson.59
(b) Section 263(3)(b) - Discretionary Factor
William Trower QC in Franbar, in considering s. 263(3)(b), stated that a
hypothetical director would consider a wide range of factors such as the
claim's prospects of success, the ability of the company to make a
recovery on any damages award, the disruption to the company, costs of
proceedings, and any damage to the company's reputation and business. 6 0
It was not these factors that were conclusive in his decision to refuse
permission. Instead it was that a hypothetical director would attach little
importance to the continuation of the derivative claim since there was an
existing, parallel unfair prejudice petition. Keay and Loughrey argue that
in Franbar, a director might still consider the continuation of the
derivative claim important despite the possibility of a s. 994 petition being
settled because of the nature of the remedy obtained. 6 1 But they seem to
be missing the point that if the wrong can be sufficiently redressed under s.
994 to the satisfaction of the applicants (here it was clear that the
applicant, Franbar, was seeking a buy-out from the majority, Casualty
Plus, and the crucial issue was valuation), there is less reason for directors
to subject the company to high costs of proceedings, reputational damage,
and disruption to the company's activities through a derivative claim,
which can easily outweigh any indirect benefits to shareholders. Attempts
by courts to formulate what a hypothetical director will consider in
relation to s. 172 means that judges are stepping into the shoes of directors
and exercising judgment about commercial matters. This seems preferable
to the alternative of courts merely subscribing to directors' commercial
decisions without formulating their own views as to s. 172.
59 [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch), [2010] BCC 387 [28].
60 Franbar [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] BCC 885 [36].
61 Keay and Loughrey, 'Derivative Proceedings in a Brave New World' (n 39) 160.
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Stainer v Lee62 provides a good illustration that courts are willing to
exercise their judicial discretion flexibly during the two-stage procedure.
Roth J was aware that the necessary evaluation of s. 263(3)(b) at this early
stage of the proceedings was not mechanistic, and that a range of factors
had to be considered to reach an overall view.63 There is a realistic
element to s. 172 despite the notion of a hypothetical director. The views
of such a hypothetical director have to be applied contextually. Here it
was the loss of interest on a loan to a company (of which the defendant
was the sole shareholder and director) over a long period of nine years
which persuaded Roth J that a director would attach much importance to
continuing the claim.64 It is not clear if it was the length of the failure to
obtain interest or the size of the interest payment, around f£8.1 million,
which was ultimately persuasive. The permission to continue was
however not a total victory since it was only granted until the conclusion
of disclosure.
(c) Observations about Sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b)
Sections 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b) clearly involve the same considerations
on many occasions as acknowledged by Lewison J in Franbar but they
both play different roles. This must be made apparent from the outset.
The key difference between these two sections is encapsulated in lesini
where s. 263(2)(a) is applicable only where the claim is obviously so
weak that no director acting in accordance with s. 172 would seek to
continue the claim.65 Section 263(3)(b) on the other hand will come into
play where some directors would seek to continue the claim, which
indicates that there is at least some material on which a hypothetical
director would attach importance to. The mandatory factor is aimed at
shutting out insufficiently cogent cases, 6 6 while the discretionary factor
allows courts to formulate specific factors, which a hypothetical director
would consider important, appropriate to each particular case so as to
imbue a 'sense of reality'. 67 Also, satisfying s. 263(2)(a) means
62 [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch), [2011] BCC 134.
63 ibid [29].
64 ibid [34]-[37].
65 lesini [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch) [86].
66 Franbar [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] BCC 885 [30].
67 HL Deb 27 February 2006, vol 679, col GC26 (Lord Goldsmith).
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automatically striking out a derivative claim without consideration of the
other bars under subsection (2), while s. 263(3)(b) is analysed in
conjunction with all the other non-exclusive factors set out in s. 263(3)
which is a mixture of the objective and factual.6 8 In this respect, Gibbs
was right when he said the key difference was between the other
subsections under s. 263(3).69
Section 172 will clearly occupy most of the courts' time in assessing
whether the mandatory or discretionary factors under sections 263(2)(a)
and 263(3)(b) apply. Important issues such as the cost of proceedings,
disruption to the company's activities and damage to the company will
clearly be applicable across most cases. But other factors may differ on a
case by case basis.
It appears that the courts will interpret s.1 72 flexibly in response to
the factual demands of each case. It is clear from the above cases that
identifying a discernable principle underlying s. 172 is illusory. For now,
we will have to make do with the few cases and make some sense out of
the court's interpretation of s. 172. But if every court were to adopt the
approach in Wishart where their Lordships thought it would be unwise, at
this early stage of development of the law on statutory derivative claims,
to attempt to state comprehensively or definitively the approach to be
followed by the court when considering an application for permission,7 0
then the time for certainty may never arrive. Someone has to take the first
plunge. Incremental development as suggested by their Lordships in
Wishart might be the easier course to take but also the slowest. It may
take many more years before a substantive body of case law on the
interpretation of s. 172 within ss. 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b) is built. The
courts will initially have to grapple with a lack of clarity over s. 172 until
a proper footpath is built.
3. Good Faith
The applicant's good faith in bringing a derivative claim is one of the
discretionary factors that the courts must take into account in considering
68 ibid.
69 Gibbs (n 23) 45.
70 [2009] CSIH 65, 2010 SC 16 [30].
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whether to give permission. The Law Commission acknowledged that a
court is unlikely to grant permission to an applicant whom it considered
was acting in bad faith but regarded it as sufficiently important to be
expressly stated.72 Unfortunately 'good faith' was not defined because it
was assumed that the meaning was generally readily recognisable.7 3 This
is regrettable because this may lead to uncertainty in the application of the
test during the permission stage and hence 'to complexity of case law.' 7 4
However, the Law Commission stated that they favoured the test of
'honestly and with no ulterior motive' although they recognised that an
applicant who may benefit commercially and thus has an ulterior motive
may still be considered by the courts as an appropriate person to bring the
action. 7 This follows the general proposition that courts wield
considerable discretion in determining whether a derivative claim should
proceed or not. An explicit definition may have been restrictive.
Nevertheless given the courts penchant for dismissing derivative claims, it
is questionable whether the court's exercise of discretion would be any
better. It may be a lesser of two evils. The Law Commission considered
that good faith should not be a prerequisite for leave. It now occupies
some form of middle ground since it is not one of the mandatory factors
but a discretionary factor that the court must take into account. Roberts
and Poole were therefore correct when they opined that the applicant's
good faith must have more weight than the Law Commission's view
'since it is impossible to countenance the court granting leave to an
applicant exhibiting bad faith.' 76
Barrett v Duckett77 is instructive in construing the application of
good faith in Part 11. The Court of Appeal denied the applicant locus
standi as she had an ulterior motive in bringing the claim, namely her
personal grievances against the defendants. She was not pursuing the
derivative claim bona fide on behalf of the company. In particular
71 Companies Act 2006, s.263(3)(a).
72 Law Com No. 246, para 6.75.
73 ibid, para 6.76.
74 Jill Poole and Pauline Roberts, 'Shareholder Remedies - Corporate Wrongs and the
Derivative Action' [1999] Journal ofBusiness Law 99, 107.
75 Law Com No. 246, paras 6.75-6.76
76 Poole and Roberts (n74) 107.
7 Barrett v Duckett [1995] BCC 362.
192
Shareholder Remedies. Demise of the Derivatives Claim? 193
evidence of the applicant acting partially towards her daughter by not
initiating litigation against her stood against the applicant. It is submitted
that the Court of Appeal came to the right conclusion as there was strong
evidence that the applicant was not considering the position of the
company but her own personal circumstances. However, if the good faith
test were to be satisfied only in cases where there was no ulterior motive,
then derivative claims would be few and far between. This was
acknowledged by Sir Mervyn Davies (sitting as a High Court judge) when
he said '[n]o doubt there is ill-feeling between [the parties] but that in
itself cannot debar [the applicant], were it to do so most derivative [claims]
would be frustrated.' 7 8 Perhaps good faith is about the honest belief of the
applicant and whether the applicant has a collateral purpose that amounts
to an abuse of process. This was the test favoured by Palmer J in the
Australian case of Swansson v R A Pratt Properties Pty Ltd.7 9 Ulterior
motive or collateral purpose clearly has a role to play in the good faith test
under s. 263(3)(a).
The equitable doctrine of 'clean hands' may have a role to play in
assessing the applicant's good faith. Payne states that '[t]he purpose of
this maxim is to prevent individuals profiting personally from their own
misbehaviour.' 80 This is strikingly similar to the wrongdoer control rule
except this time the wrongdoer is the applicant. Payne further argues that
the 'clean hands' doctrine seems likely to be retained: firstly, through the
courts when they take account of 'all relevant circumstances without limit'
when determining whether to grant permission to continue and, secondly,
through the applicant's good faith.8' The doctrine permits the defendant to
raise the personal actions and circumstances of the applicant as a defence.
In an unfair prejudice petition this is not at all surprising as it is a personal
action. However, in a derivative claim redressing corporate wrongs, the
utility this doctrine has is questionable 'since the issue for the court is
doing justice to the company, and not to the shareholder, through the
derivative [claim] device.' 8 2 Therefore, it is advisable that the courts
78 Barrett v Duckett [1993] BCC 778, 786.
79 (2002) NSWSC 583 [36] (Supreme Court of New South Wales).
8o Jennifer Payne, "'Clean Hands" in Derivative Actions' (2002) 61 Cambridge Law
Journal 76, 77.
81 ibid 80.
82 ibid 81.
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should not employ the 'clean hands' doctrine in Part 11 lest this opens a
can of worms.
Lewison J in lesini briefly touched on the gist of Nurcombe v
Nurcombe which is that 'a person may be prevented from bringing a
derivative claim if he participated in the wrong of which he
complains... .'83 This suggests that where there is even an indication that
an applicant who brings a derivative claim is tainted with impropriety this
may work against the applicant. Does this mean an applicant has to adopt
a saint-like demeanour? Keay and Loughrey suggest that lesini points
towards early signs that the 'clean hands' doctrine will re-emerge in the
statutory derivative claim. 84 It is unavoidable that the 'clean hands'
doctrine may reappear in the new regime because good faith requires an
in-depth look into the applicant's motives and conduct. This will naturally
lead us to the equitable realm of 'he who comes to equity must come with
clean hands.'
In Franbar, the judge refused to hold that the applicant was not
acting in good faith on the grounds that the refusal to accept a buy-out of
the shares did not evidence a lack of good faith. He accepted that the
applicant's motive in continuing the derivative claim was to ensure that
the value extracted from its shareholding would be full and fair. But that
in certain cases this may not be a legitimate use of a derivative claim.
However, this was a factor which was more relevant to the availability of
an alternative remedy under s. 263(3)(f). 8 5 Although the judge did not
make a direct ruling as to the applicant's ulterior motive, it is clear that he
was satisfied that the applicant had no improper motive.
Mission Capital shows that, provided some evidence can be shown
as to why a derivative claim is useful to the company and not only to the
applicant personally, then the possibility of the applicant deriving some
personal benefit from the derivative claim will not necessarily mean the
applicant lacks good faith. It must be shown that 'there is a real purpose in
bringing the proceedings... .'86 In Wishart their Lordships were aware that
the question of good faith may require evidence covering the merits of the
83 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), [2010] BCC 420 [122].
84 Keay and Loughrey, 'Derivative Proceedings in a Brave New World' (n 39) 168.
85 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] BCC 885 [32]-[34].
86 [2008] EWHC 1339 (Ch), [2008] BCC 866 [42].
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proposed claim but they were mindful that this should not be turned into a
full dress rehearsal. 87 The issue of good faith can easily turn into a battle
of affidavits of 'he said, she said'. To prevent this, it is proposed that
evidence provided to the courts be concise and pertinent to the issue of
good faith. But this often can be difficult where courts use evidence to
draw inferences about the applicant's motive. In seeking to paint a bigger
picture, parties may be tempted to provide as much material as possible.
The judge in Kiani v Cooper" found that withdrawal transfer of
money by the applicant from the company's bank account to the
applicant's personal account was not evidence of bad faith. Two factors
persuaded the judge that this was not evidence of lack of good faith.
Firstly, some of the monies were used to pay the company's creditors and,
secondly, the monies were still in existence. 8 9 Therefore, more good than
bad had been done to the company by the withdrawal of the monies.
Allegations of lack of good faith were brought by the defendants in
Stainer v Lee 9 0 too. The defendants pointed to the fact that the applicant
had sought a previous buy-out of his shares. The bringing of the derivative
claim was in pursuance of the applicant's personal vendetta against the
defendant for failing to offer a better price for the shares. Roth J was not
impressed by this argument as he stated that it was entirely understandable
that the applicant as a minority shareholder would seek to protect his
interests. In addition, the applicant was commencing the claim on behalf
of a large number of other minority shareholders. The applicant's good
faith was bolstered by strong evidence of letters of support and financial
contribution from thirty-five other small shareholders. 91 One has to
wonder whether Roth J would have come to the same conclusion in
relation to the applicant's good faith if evidence of letters of support and
financial contribution from other shareholders had not been presented.
Without such evidence, it would have been difficult for the applicant to
establish that the derivative claim was brought for the benefit of the
company.
[2009] CSIH 65, 2010 SC 16 [27].
[2010] EWHC 577 (Ch), [2010] BCC 463.
89 ibid [36].
90 [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch), [2011] BCC 134.
9' ibid [49].
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Lewison J in Jesini said that an applicant would not be disqualified
from bringing a derivative claim even if there are other benefits which the
applicant would derive from the claim.92 Here the dominant purpose of the
claim was to benefit the company and the existence of a collateral purpose,
namely a benefit of an indemnity from a third party, did not establish a
lack of good faith. This benefit was not enough to convince Lewison J
that the applicant lacked good faith.
Distinguishing between a dominant purpose and collateral purpose
can be a difficult exercise. This is reminiscent of the problematic principal
or larger purpose exceptions in the law of financial assistance. Significant
interplays between the different purposes often make it difficult to
distinguish between the primary and secondary purpose. This is because
disentangling the numerous strands can be evidentially difficult and even
more so in allocating a relative weighting to each strand.9 3 The applicant's
good faith test under s. 263(3)(a) is best encapsulated here by the
statement of Lewison J that 'if the [applicant] brings a derivative claim for
the benefit of the company, he will not be disqualified from doing so if
there are other benefits which he will derive from the claim.' 94 The main
prevailing advantage of pursuing a derivative claim has to flow to the
company, while any other minor associated benefits that an applicant
derives will be permissible.
The discussion of the applicant's good faith in Stimpson was fudged
since Judge Pelling QC was not willing to state whether the applicant's
motives strictly demonstrated a lack of good faith. Instead he said that this
was not material since s. 263(3) was not exhaustive of the matters that
were required to be considered. The applicant's motivation in bringing the
derivative claim was because he did not want the company to lose its
identity or for him to lose control of the company. 95 This shows that
courts may find it more convenient to justify their decisions in an open
manner without committing their explanations to a particular box.
However, this can result in an ill-defined development of the court's
jurisdiction as a consequence of protracted proceedings bringing about
92 lesini [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), [2010] BCC 420 [121].
93 Hannigan and Prentice, (n 32) para 4.70.
94 lesini [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), [2010] BCC 420 [121].
95 Stimpson [2009] EWHC 2072 (Ch), [2010] BCC 387 [44].
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ambiguity. 9 6 Therefore, it is submitted that courts should confine their
reasoning as best they can within the particular factors in s. 263(3). This
ensures that practitioners are aware of which particular factor is being
discussed instead of performing guesswork.
4. Ratification
Ratification remains pertinent to the new statutory derivative claim. It is
regrettable that the Law Commission did not support reform of the
substantive law on ratification. It was their view that any changes would
need to be considered within a comprehensive review of directors' duties.
It would not be appropriate to make piecemeal changes within the reform
of shareholder remedies which may have wider implications. 9 7 However,
there should have been an overhaul of the law on ratification considering
the closeness between derivative claims and ratification through the
principle of 'majority rule'. The courts will generally not entertain claims
brought by the minority in relation to matters which the majority can
decide because what will happen is that 'a meeting has to be called, and
then ultimately the majority gets it wishes.' 98 'Majority rule' remains an
established principle of company law and a central theme underlying
ratification.
It is likely that issues which plagued the derivative claim in common
law will reappear in the new regime as questions about whether
ratification has been effective and ratifiability will retain importance.
Some commentators have suggested that the effectiveness of a purported
ratification 'will reintroduce pleadings similar to those necessary under
the [common] law', 9 9 which 'will dominate the hearing for leave and...
[are] unlikely to result in a change of emphasis.' 00 This suggests that the
issue of 'effective ratification' will detract the court from focusing on
other areas as they are too busy addressing the effectiveness of a
purported ratification. Besides this, ratifiability is to be taken into account
by the courts as one of the discretionary hurdles under s. 263(3)(c)(ii).
96 Keay and Loughrey, 'Derivative Proceedings in a Brave New World' (n 39) 168.
97 Law Corn No. 246, para 6.85.
98 MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13 (CA) 25.
99 Poole and Roberts (n74) 109.
100 Lowry and Reisberg (n 48) 234.
UCL Journal ofLaw and Jurisprudence
Although ratifiability is no longer a complete bar to a derivative claim, it
is likely that the courts will order an adjournment of the permission
hearing to consider whether the wrong will be ratified by the company in
a meeting. Excessive use of adjournments may suggest a policy of
encouraging internal solutions while discouraging derivative claims.
One of the crucial changes to ratification is in relation to voting since
s. 239 now provides that the votes of wrongdoing directors and connected
members will be disregarded in ratifying such wrongdoing conduct. This
reverses the decision in North West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty.101
This change is welcomed since wrongdoers should not be able to use their
voting powers to ratify a wrong in which they participated, as their
decision will clearly be tainted by bias and impropriety.
So far only two cases have properly considered the issue of
ratification - Franbar and Stainer v Lee. In Franbar, William Trower QC
stated that the 'connected person' provisions in ss. 239(3) and 239(4)
impose additional requirements for effective ratification which draw on
existing equitable rules but which impose more stringent demands.
Furthermore, 'wrongdoer control' remains relevant to ratification in cases
where the 'connected persons' provision in s. 239(4) has not been
satisfied.10 2 Arguably his intention was to capture those situations where s.
239(4) has not been satisfied but actual 'wrongdoer control' exists, the
wrongdoers should not then be able to ratify their wrongdoing by utilising
a 'loophole' in the statutory derivative claim.
The concept of 'wrongdoer control' which the Law Commission had
been so keen to remove has now crept back in. 'Wrongdoer control' was
concerned with standing. It is not clear why wrongdoer control should be
reintroduced to the statutory derivative claim since the mandatory and
discretionary factors under ss. 263(2) and 263(3) are adequate screening
mechanisms in determining permission. Mr Trower's statement
emphasises the relevance of ratification and non-ratifiable breaches in
Part 11 as it was in common law. Thus, questions regarding reconciliation
101 (1887) LR 12 App Cas 589.
102 Franbar [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch), [2008] BCC 885 [44]-[45].
198
Shareholder Remedies: Demise of the Derivatives Claim? 199
of the conflicting cases of Cook v Deeks10 3 and Regal (Hastings) Ltd v
Gulliverl04 will inherently arise in the new regime.
Yap argues that in light of the s. 239 element of disinterested
shareholders' approval in ratification, 'there appears to be much less
reason to require the courts to scrutinize the nature of the transaction to
see if it falls within the hazy ambit of the principle of non-ratifiable
breaches." 0 5 This would certainly be welcomed in terms of avoiding the
issue of whether English law adopts the transaction-based theory or
voting-based theory of ratification since such uncertainty is capable of
lengthening and complicating the two-stage procedure. There seems to be
a shift towards a voting-based theory following the introduction of the
new connected persons/disinterested shareholder's provision in s. 239.106
This may bring forth issues such as vote counting and identification
of connected persons. This may be fairly easy to comply within a small
company but in large public companies that tend to vote by proxy this
matter is less straightforward. In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman
107Industries , Vinelott J in first instance observed that in a large company
the wrongdoing directors 'might be able to determine the outcome of a
resolution in general meeting in their own favour by the use of proxy
votes.' 108 Furthermore, it is challenging to unravel the often intricate
'shareholding linkages' in large companies, which makes it difficult to
identify particular shareholders who may be influenced in the way they
vote by the wrongdoers, their nominees, relatives and friends. 109 This
makes the breadth of the 'connected persons' provision potentially very
wide; identifying shareholders' motivation in voting can be elusive.
Despite these practical difficulties, a voting-based approach seems
preferable than attempting to determine ahead the types of wrongs that are
103 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554 (PC).
104 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [ 1967] 2 AC 134 (HL).
105 Ji Lian Yap, 'Reforming Ratification' (2011) 40 Common Law World Review 1, 10.
106 Companies Act 2006, s.239 should be read together with s. 252 to determine the
meaning of 'connected persons'.
107 [1981] Ch 257.
108 ibid 324.
109 Pearlie Koh, 'Directors' Fiduciary Duties: Unthreading the Joints of Shareholder
Ratification' (2005) 5 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 363, 389.
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or may possibly be in the company's interests. 110 The factual
circumstances of each case differ and to assume that a particular category
of transaction is applicable across the board is simplistic. Furthermore,
Payne argues that a transaction-based approach exacerbates the
difficulties in ratification, and the better approach is to determine whether
shareholders are acting contrary to the interests of the company rather
than attempting to extrapolate information from the circumstances
surrounding the wrongdoing."' This resembles the approach of Part 11,
albeit the courts do not have to fully assess whether shareholders are
voting in the best interests of the company, or look at their individual
motivations. The courts simply have to examine ss. 249 and 252.
In Stainer v Lee, Roth J was concerned with the question of informed
consent. He was not satisfied that the shareholders voting by proxy in
favour of the resolution approving the new loan agreement could be said
to have given informed consent:1 12 the notice giving information did not
satisfy the principles of fair disclosure of the purpose for which the
meeting was convened,1 3 and that a notice must contain the contents of
the agreement.114 This case highlights that the issue of 'fully informed
consent' remains relevant to ratification. This may lead to protracted
permission hearings since determining whether there has been 'fully
informed consent' will inevitably lead the courts to an extensive
evidentiary analysis of documentation.
Contrary to the gloomy predictions of many commentators,
ratification has not become a colossal battleground in the new statutory
derivative claim (as yet). Also, it has not become a technique frequently
employed by wrongdoing directors or controlling shareholders to restrain
a derivative claim.' However, the fact that effective ratification will bar
110 Hans C. Hirt, 'Ratification of Breaches of Directors' Duties: the Implications of the
Reform Proposal regarding the Availability of Derivative Actions' (2004) 25
Company Lawyer 197, 205.
Jennifer Payne, 'A Re-examination of Ratification' (1999) 58 Cambridge Law
Journal 604, 615.
112 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch), [2011] BCC 134 [46].
113 Kaye v Croydon Tramways Co [1898] 1 Ch 358.
114 Pacific Coast Coal Mines Ltd v Arbuthnot [ 1917] AC 607.
"s Paul Von Nessen, S. H. Goo and Chee Keong Low, 'The Statutory Derivative
Action: Now Showing Near You' [2008] Journal ofBusiness Law 627, 661.
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a claim under s. 263(2)(c)(ii) may have led to a dwindling of the already
small numbers of derivative claims. Not many lawyers (except
unscrupulous ones) would advice their client to pursue a derivative claim
having ascertained the existence of effective ratification. Despite
ratification only being properly considered in two cases to date, future
case law will be able to provide a better indication as to whether the
'minimalist' approach adopted by the Law Commission to ratification will
significantly attenuate the value of their work in constructing a new
derivative claim.116 The two cases above have shown that the concept of
wrongdoer control, non-ratifiable breaches and fully informed consent
may re-emerge in the new regime. Thus, it is regrettable that there was no
overhaul of the substantive law of ratification during the reform process.
The better route would have been to remove 'effective' ratification as a
complete bar in the new statutory derivative claim as is the case in
Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa and Canada. This would
have removed uncertainties and inconsistencies in the law of ratification
so that the statutory derivative claim could truly deliver 'modern, flexible
and accessible criteria.'117
D. INDEMNITY COSTS ORDERS
Financial considerations will usually be the first factor which informs a
shareholder as to whether it is worth pursuing a derivative claim.
Regardless of how strong a claim and aggrieved a shareholder, this is
negligible without a strong financial footing for shareholders to pursue a
derivative claim. Indemnity costs orders have been assumed to be the
answer to providing financial incentives to shareholders. Therefore, no
change was made to the court's power to make indemnity costs orders in
derivative claims. 18 This has been criticised as leaving the derivative
claim with a missing crucial procedure 9 and rightly so. There were
surprisingly even concerns that indemnity costs orders would create an
116 Anthony J. Boyle, Minority Shareholders' Remedies (Cambridge University Press
2002) 77.
117 Law Com No. 246, para 6.15.
118 Law Com No. 142, para 17.8.
119 Mahmoud Almadani, 'Derivative Actions: does the Companies Act 2006 Offer a
Way Forward?' (2009) 30 Company Lawyer 131, 138.
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additional incentive for some individuals to initiate unmeritorious and
frivolous claim. 120 This misplaced notion was likely encouraged by the
Law Commission's view that there is a compelling reason to pursue a
derivative claim because of the possibility of an indemnity costs order.121
This misses the crucial point that indemnity costs orders are not automatic
rights or generously granted. So a claimant will potentially be exposed to
significant costs since he or she cannot be certain as to whether the court
will exercise its discretionary powers to grant an indemnity costs order.122
Without prospective certainty as to whether the courts will order the
company to pay the shareholders' costs of litigation, shareholders may be
deterred from pursuing a derivative claim. Furthermore, shareholders may
be at risk of paying litigation expenses as well as the legal expenses of the
defendant if the claim is unsuccessful. The use of derivative claims will
rarely be rational in light of this deadly mix of financial disincentives. 12 3
Reducing costs is therefore crucial in overhauling the derivative claim and
increasing the paucity of litigation.
Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2)124 is authority for the proposition that a
shareholder who brings a derivative claim may be indemnified by the
company in respect of costs the shareholder has incurred, even if the claim
should fail, provided the shareholder acted in good faith and on
reasonable grounds. 12 5 Further, it was held in Smith v Croft (No. 1)126 that
claimants applying for a costs indemnity order must show that it is
genuinely needed, 127 and it may be appropriate to leave a proportion of the
costs to the claimants to spur them on to proceed with the claim. 128
Indemnity costs orders are provided for under the Civil Procedure Rules,
which state that '[t]he court may order the company . . . to indemnify the
claimant against liability for costs incurred in the permission application
120 HL Deb 27 February 2006, vol 679, col GC13 (Lord Grabiner).
121 Law Com No. 142, para 18.1.
122 Hannigan and Prentice (n 32) para 4.86.
123 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (Oxford University
Press 2007) 222.
124 [1975] QB 373.
125 ibid 403-404.
126 [1986] 1 WLR 580.
127 ibid 597.
128 ibid 580-81.
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or in the derivative claim or both.'1 29 The ruling by the court in Smith v
Croft (No. 1) was not followed by Lewison J in lesini as he preferred to
adopt the view of Michael Wheeler QC in Jaybird Group Limited v
Wood 13 0 that indemnity costs orders are not limited to impecunious
claimants. 131 This view is preferable since the benefit of any remedy
accrues to the company and it should not matter how wealthy an applicant
is. There may be borderline cases where the applicant is deemed
sufficiently well-off so as not to be granted indemnity costs during the
permission stage. Nevertheless should the claim be protracted in nature,
costs will mount up and the claimant may be faced with an uphill task of
obtaining sufficient funds for the remaining stages. The applicant could
possibly seek a further order for indemnity costs as this is fully within the
discretion of the courts under CPR 19.9E.
Recent cases highlight that the courts have taken a fairly pragmatic
stance to indemnity costs orders. In Kiani v Cooper, Proudman J made a
limited indemnity costs order in favour of the applicant but not in respect
of any adverse costs order. He further commented that the applicant
should assume part of the risk of litigation. 132 This is similar to the
principle in Smith v Croft (No. 1) where it was held that some proportion
of the costs should be borne by the claimants to spur the claim on. It can
be clearly seen that this area remains a delicate balancing exercise for
courts. Courts should not be too generous in granting indemnity costs
orders because of the likelihood of opening a floodgate of claims, and yet
they cannot be too severe in their approach since this may hinder genuine
derivative claims from being pursued.
Roth J in Stainer v Lee adopted a slightly more permissive
interpretation when he stated that Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2) is clear
authority that a shareholder who is granted permission to continue should
normally be indemnified as to such reasonable costs by the company for
whose benefit the claim is taken.133 However, he then placed a ceiling on
prospective indemnity costs at a £40,000 limit but with permission to
129 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, 19.9E.
130 Jaybird Group Limited v Wood [1986] BCLC 319, 327.
131 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), [2010] BCC 420 [125].
132 Kiani v Cooper [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch), [2010] BCC 463 [49].
133 Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch), [2011] BCC 134 [56].
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apply for extension. It was felt that the applicant's costs could become
disproportionate where the amount of likely recovery was presently
uncertain.13 4 Is this striking the right balance? Roth J was not closing the
door towards an extension and the possibility of further indemnity costs
should be a sufficient incentive for applicants. This approach allows
courts to monitor the progress of the claim at every stage while
reassessing the adequacy of indemnity costs as appropriate to the
particular circumstances. Such a practical approach seems to strike the
right balance in enabling shareholders to bring derivative claims without
being a significant drain on their personal finances.
Wishart provides a more thorough discussion of indemnity costs
orders and shows the courts' cautious approach. Their Lordships preferred
to allow the law on this matter to develop incrementally instead of stating
comprehensively or definitively the approach which should be
followed.13 5 How far their approach will be followed by the English courts
will have to be seen since the court made it abundantly clear that their
observations were based on the present circumstances and submissions
which were made in the case. Their Lordships considered that the
appropriateness of an indemnity should be determined in the leave
proceedings (i.e., the permission stage in England and Wales) rather than
at the substantive hearing.1 3 6 This has been followed in the above cases of
lesini, Kiani v Cooper and Stainer v Lee. This approach is advantageous
to applicants. They are given a degree of certainty early on during the
permission stage before truly committing themselves to the cause, which
by then may be too late for them as the costs incurred may be substantial.
In Wishart their Lordships also stated that the terms of an indemnity
costs order 'should reflect the fact that there is a limit to the extent to
which the court can assess, in advance, the reasonableness of [the
applicant] having incurred any particular liability or expense.'l 37 Both the
judges in Kiani v Cooper and Stainer v Lee placed a limit to indemnity
costs whether by way of confining indemnity costs to all costs except
adverse costs orders or an imposition of a ceiling on costs. This is in
134 ibid.
135 Wishart [2009] CSIH 65, 2010 SC 16 [49].
136 ibid [62].
137 ibid [68].
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keeping with the foregoing statement in Wishart about the dangers of the
court's writing a blank cheque for the shareholder as to the amount of
expenses that can be incurred in the derivative proceeding.138
The seemingly generous attitude of the courts to granting prospective
indemnity costs orders is considerably weakened by a countervailing
reluctance by the courts to be decisive. Without being unnecessarily
restrictive in refusing to grant a prospective indemnity costs order during
the permission stage because of difficulties with quantifying liabilities and
expenses, the courts in Kiani v Cooper and Stainer v Lee have instead
taken a pragmatic approach. The courts appreciate that indemnity costs
orders can be granted up to a specified stage and with permission to apply
for extension once a further stage has been reached. Although the courts
in the above cases did not explicitly endorse the ruling in Wishart, it is
clear that the approach in Wishart was followed. This is a further
indication that indemnity costs orders will not be the panacea for
remedying the funding worries of shareholders but at least remains a
possible resource.
E. PURSUING CORPORATE RELIEF IN UNFAIR PREJUDICE PETITIONS
The possibility of pursuing corporate relief in unfair prejudice petitions
has expanded the use of s. 994 while simultaneously relegating the
statutory derivative claim to the sidelines. In Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No.
2), 139 Lord Millett provided guidance as to the relationship between
derivative and personal claims in relation to unfair prejudice, which is
essentially that a misconduct claim lies with a derivative claim, while
wider instances of conduct requiring a broader remedy lie with the unfair
prejudice petition. 140 Thus, it was well-established that a minority
shareholder pursuing a corporate remedy does so by way of a derivative
claim while seeking an unfair prejudice petition for a personal remedy.
However, in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc,141 Hoffmann LJ equally
made it clear that '[e]nabling the court in an appropriate case to outflank
the rule in Foss v Harbottle was one of the purposes of [CA 2006, s.
138 ibid.
139 Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No. 2) [1990] BCC 605.
140 ibid 625.
141 [1994] BCC 475.
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994].' 142 Judicial flexibility meant that in particular circumstances s. 994
(then s. 459) petitions could be used even though a derivative claim, being
the more appropriate action, was unavailable due to the restrictive rules in
Foss v Harbottle. The breadth of protection under the unfair prejudice
petition makes it an extremely attractive remedy for minority shareholders.
Courts have interpreted s. 994 flexibly which is in direct contrast to the
cautious and restrictive interpretation of derivative claims. Perhaps this
bolder approach has been partly spurred on by the wording of s. 996 that
grants a court wide discretion to 'make such order as it thinks fit for
giving relief' This has played a substantial role in elevating unfair
prejudice petitions as the remedy of choice of most minority shareholders,
particularly in small private companies.
The recent cases of Clark v Cutland1 4 3 and Gamlestaden Fastigheter
AB v Baltic Partners Ltdl4 4 highlight the courts' concessionary attitude in
granting corporate relief in unfair prejudice petitions. In Clark v Cutland,
the Court of Appeal granted corporate relief to the company on the unfair
prejudice petition. The use of s. 996 in this way does approximate the
solution suggested by Lowry of broadening the relief provided by s. 996
to include the power to direct that profits and damages be accounted in
favour of the company itself.14 5 However, what Lowry was suggesting
was an established statutory basis for such relief and not judicial decision-
making. As a reminder, the claimant in Clark v Cutland had commenced
both a derivative claim and unfair prejudice petition against the defendant
which were subsequently consolidated. This was not a pure unfair
prejudice petition but a claim which involved elements of unfairly
prejudicial conduct and misconduct more appropriate to derivative claims.
This liberal attitude towards using the unfair prejudice petition to grant
corporate relief is reminiscent to the case of Lowe v Fahey.146 There it was
held that s. 461 (now s. 996) conferred a wide jurisdiction, which meant a
petitioner was entitled to seek an order that those involved in the unlawful
diversion provide for payment to the company itself in circumstances
142 ibid 489.
143 [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2004] 1 WLR 783.
144 [2007] UKPC 26, [2007] Bus LR 1521.
145 John Lowry, 'Reconstructing Shareholder Actions: a Response to the Law
Commission's Consultation Paper' (1997) 18 Company Lawyer 247, 255.
146 [1996] BCC 320.
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where the unfairly prejudicial conduct involved wrongful diversion of
funds.14 7
These cases show that, prior to corporate relief being granted on an
unfair prejudice petition, there must have been mixed grounds comprising
unfairly prejudicial conduct and corporate misconduct. This at least
provides for the statutory derivative claim retaining some usefulness in
cases where the only ground is a corporate wrong since it is apparent that
an action must be commenced as a derivative claim if the only ground for
petition rests on a corporate wrong. 148 However, it is not difficult to
envisage circumstances where ingenious lawyers can 'conjure up' the
existence of unfairly prejudicial conduct even in clear-cut cases of
corporate wrongs. Past cases have shown that courts have been rather
generous in accepting that breaches of directors' duties are capable of
establishing unfairly prejudicial conduct. For instance in Re a Company
(No. 008699 of 1985)149 the directors of the company provided advice as
to the acceptance of competing bids. It was held that this was potentially a
breach of the directors' fiduciary duties and could constitute unfairly
prejudicial conduct.15 0 The flexibility of the court's approach to assessing
the existence of unfairly prejudicial conduct is a result of their jurisdiction
under s. 994 which has 'an elastic quality which enables the courts to
mould the concepts of unfair prejudice according to the circumstances of
the case." 5 '
The Privy Council decision in Gamlestaden is likely to provide
further support that an unfair prejudice petition can be used to provide
corporate relief. Lord Scott of Foscote held that the wide language of the
unfair prejudice provisions allowed for the Privy Council's jurisdiction to
grant an order for payment of damages to the company.152 Surprisingly no
reference was made to Lord Scott's previous judgment in Re Chime Corp
Ltdl53 where he laid down two criteria which should be satisfied by the
petitioner, namely (1) that the order for payment to be made by a
147 ibid 325.
148 Poole and Roberts (n 74) 117.
149 Re a Company (No. 008699 ofl985) [1986] BCC 99024.
150 ibid 99029.
151 Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354, 404.
152 [2007] UKPC 26, [2007] Bus LR 1521 [28].
153 Re Chime Corp Ltd [2004] 3 HKLRD 922.
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respondent to the company corresponds with the order to which the
company would have been entitled had it sued or if a derivative claim had
been made; and (2) that it is clear at the pleading stage that a
determination of the amount, if any, of the director's liability at law to the
company can conveniently be dealt with in the hearing of the petition.15 4
Having passed up the opportunity to confirm or clarify the criteria
specified in Re Chime Corp Ltd, it is regrettable that Lord Scott did not
provide further guidance as to when the court's power under s. 994 to
make a corporate remedy should be exercised. However, Cheung
questions whether the restatement in Gamlestaden without reference to
the criteria is an 'accurate summary of principles' derived from Lord
Scott's earlier judgment in Re Chime. '5 5 But without more and simply on
the reading of Lord Scott's judgment in Gamlestaden, there is a strong
indication that an unfair prejudice petition can be used to obtain corporate
relief without satisfying the two criteria.
Payne suggests that s. 994 petitions will effectively supersede
derivative claims in the future, 156 while Hannigan believes Clark v
Cutland and Gamlestaden are in reality very limited and that
fundamentally they are classic derivative claims, not unfairly prejudicial
cases at all. 157 The consolidation of the derivative claim and unfair
prejudice petition in Clark v Cutland should not detract from the fact that
that the Court of Appeal treated the unfair prejudice petition as if it were a
derivative claim, and as stated by Arden LJ 'it was in the [unfair prejudice]
proceedings that relief was ultimately granted.' 158 The unfair prejudice
petition was ultimately the decisive jurisdiction in which corporate relief
was granted. The views expressed by Payne are likely to be realised in the
future as Clark v Cutland and Gamlestaden represent a novel but
legitimate interpretation of the breadth of protection under s. 996. This is
coupled with (1) the absence of a restrictive permission stage in s. 996
154 ibid [62].
155 Rita Cheung, Company Law and Shareholders' Rights (LexisNexis Butterworths
2010) 289.
156 Jennifer Payne, 'Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: the Future of
Shareholder Protection' (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal 647, 676.
157 Brenda Hannigan, 'Drawing Boundaries between Derivative Claims and Unfairly
Prejudicial Petitions' [2009] Journal ofBusiness Law 606, 623-24.
158 [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2004] 1 WLR 783 [2].
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petitions, (2) the advantages of obtaining direct personal remedies and
corporate remedies under s. 996, and (3) ratification not being a bar to an
unfair prejudice petition. The possibility of indemnity costs orders in
derivative claims may shift the scale slightly away from unfair prejudice.
But as examined above, the indemnity costs order do not provide a strong
enough financial incentive for shareholders to pursue derivative claims.
On balance, the unfair prejudice remedy will remain the 'remedy of
choice among shareholders." 59
F. CONCLUSION
The restrictive standing requirements in Foss v Harbottle have in effect
been replaced by judicial control over the streamlined list of factors under
Part 11. The approach of the courts to these factors in practice has so far
been unclear due to their refusal in making a committed standpoint to the
factors being considered. Such uncertainty has left a void in terms of
predicting the outcome of a derivative claim. Furthermore, Wishart is a
reminder that the courts prefer incremental development. For now we can
only make an educated guess as to how courts will construe factors such
as the prima facie case, good faith, s. 172 and ratification in practice.
Previous case law provides significant but limited assistance as the new
regime provides courts with a wide discretion to interpret the factors in a
different manner.
Recent cases do however show that concepts or tests which existed
in common law such as prima facie, good faith and ratification have been
interpreted so as to stay close to their origins. These are factors which do
not pose as much concern to practitioners as the new s. 172 terminology.
Recent case law has shown that the bulk of the courts' reasoning have
been dedicated to s. 172. Nevertheless it is far from clear as to how courts
in future cases will construe s. 172 and waiting for a substantive body of
case law to be built will be agonising. The new statutory derivative claim
was meant to deliver a 'more modern, flexible and accessible criteria for
determining whether a shareholder should be able to pursue the action.'l 60
But the uncertainty that presently exists has led to vague and
inaccessible criteria. Furthermore, whatever procedural benefits provided
159 Cheffins (n 15) 259.
160 Law Com No. 246, para 6.15.
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by Part 11 will be insignificant in light of the approach to indemnity costs
orders and the possibility of obtaining corporate relief in unfair prejudice
petitions. Providing sufficient financial incentive is the key to building up
the statutory derivative claim but the court's limited approach to
indemnity costs orders has not provided the catalyst for pursuing
derivative claims. This was probably the intended result. With the
growing attractiveness of the unfair prejudice remedy, one can only
wonder whether the derivative claim has any role to play in the arsenal of
shareholder remedies. For now at least, the costs of pursuing a derivative
claim outweigh its benefits (if any). Until a more definitive guideline for
the list of factors in the two-stage procedure is provided by the courts and
a bold approach is taken to granting indemnity costs orders, the demise of
the derivative claim seems inevitable.
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